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ment. Second, household investment is less volatile than business investment with a
relative volatility of .62. We show that increasing the degree of household capital com-
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I Introduction
Fisher (2007) shows that household capital complementarity in market production can explain
a key stylized fact of investment dynamics in the US—that household investment leads business
investment over the business cycle. Fisher shows that when this complementarity is present in a
real business cycle model with home production it makes household capital contribute to producing
both home goods and market goods, compared to business capital which contributes to producing
only market goods. This asymmetry provides incentives for households to accumulate household
capital ahead of business capital after a positive productivity shock. He provides empirical evidence
that supports the presence of household capital in market production.
We demonstrate that Fisher’s (2007) explanation relies crucially on an extremely high tax of 70%
on capital income (nearly two times the statutory corporate tax rate in the US). The model produces
two counterfactual results when the capital tax rate is calibrated to 35%—a rate consistent with
empirical estimates of the effective capital tax rate in the literature. First, household investment
lags business investment. Second, household investment is less volatile than business investment,
with a relative volatility of .62.
Why does the complementarity mechanism fail to generate the lead of household investment
over business investment? When capital income taxation is extremely high (70%), the incentive
to invest in business capital is heavily dampened relative to the incentive to invest in household
capital. However, when capital income taxation is in line with the empirical estimates in the recent
literature (35%), the relative incentive to accumulate business capital is sufficiently strengthened
and the model cannot generate the lead of household investment over business investment for
plausible estimates of the degree of household capital complementarity.
In the rest of this comment, we first discuss why it is correct to use a moderate calibration
of 35% for the capital income tax rate instead of 70%. We then demonstrate that Fisher’s (2007)
model produces counterfactual investment dynamics under the moderate calibration of the capital
income tax rate. Finally, we show that increasing the degree of household capital complementarity
cannot resolve these problems because the model produces counterfactual factor shares in market
production relative to the empirical estimates in Fisher (2007).
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We conclude that an explanation of the long-standing stylized facts of US investment dynamics
in a plausibly calibrated model remains a significant challenge for understanding the origins of
business cycles and their propagation.
II Capital income taxation rate
Following Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995), several researchers used an extremely high
tax on capital income in models with home production (see Panel A in Table 1). The reason is a
technical one. Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995) find that a capital taxation rate of at least
70% is needed for the home-production model to match capital’s share coefficient in the market
production function in line with National Income Accounts data.1 But, more recently, Gomme and
Rupert (2007) have pointed out that this justification is incorrect because the calculation computes
the capital tax rate holding the after-tax real interest rate fixed. Instead, the pre-tax real interest
rate should be held fixed and allow after-tax real interest rate to vary with the capital tax rate.
With this correction, capital taxation has no effect on matching either the capital share or the
capital-output ratio. Gomme and Rupert’s (2007) calibration based on the calculation of capital
income tax similar to Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) gives a rate of 29%.
To provide some empirical justification for the extremely high calibration of the capital income
tax rate, Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995) had relied on an earlier paper by Feldstein,
Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) which computed a high average effective capital tax rate of
approximately 65% over 1953-1979 period. Fisher (2007) also cites the Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux,
and Poterba’s (1983) estimate for the 70% calibration of marginal capital income tax rate, inter-
preting it as the effective tax rate. As mentioned above, there is no technical reason to require a
high capital tax rate in the model. It is, therefore, appropriate to evaluate model properties using
a calibration that closely matches the recent marginal capital income tax rate estimates in the
US. Importantly, all of these estimates are significantly lower than the earlier average estimate of
Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983).
1In models without home production, this extreme calibration is not necessary as all capital is market
capital.
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II.I Why is a 35% capital income tax rate the correct calibration?
There are four reasons why a capital income tax rate of 35% is justified as the correct calibration
for the US capital income tax rate in the model.
First, this rate is the median of moderate estimates in the literature, i.e. those below 40% (see
Table 1, Panel C) and coincides with the calibration of McGrattan and Prescott (2005). McGrattan
and Prescott (2005) have pointed out the sharp fall in US corporate income tax rate since the 1960s.
They estimate US corporate income tax rate of 43% in the period 1960–1969 and 35% in the period
1990–2001. Notably, their measure of the corporate income tax includes federal, state, and local
profits tax accruals as do the estimates of Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983). Again,
these tax rates are significantly lower than the average value of 65% calculated in Feldstein, Dicks-
Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) for the pre-1980 period.
Second, the moderate capital tax rate estimates of under 40% in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994), McGrattan and Prescott (2005), Gomme and Rupert (2007), McDaniel (2007), and Gomme,
Ravikumar, and Rupert (2011) (see Panel C in Table 1) are based on a neoclassical framework
similar to that in Fisher (2007). These effective tax estimates include corporate taxation, real
estate property taxes, state and local taxes, and other taxes (licensing fees) as, for example, in the
estimate of Gomme, Ravikumar, and Rupert (2011) for the 1954-2008 period.
Third, the moderate capital tax rates are in line with the very detailed recent work of Cooper
et al. (2015) on measuring the tax rate on US business income. To quote Cooper et al. (2015):
[...] estimates imply an average tax rate on U.S. business income of 24.3%. We believe
this estimate to be the most comprehensive estimate available of the average tax rate
on U.S. business income [...]. [H]undreds of economic models require an assumption
on the U.S. federal tax rate paid on U.S. business income. Authors frequently use top
statutory rates on C-corporate income: 35% (considering only annual corporate taxes)
or 45% (considering dividend and capital gains taxation as well). We estimate that
this substantially overstates the average tax rate paid on U.S. business income.
Fourth, as shown in Table 2, the two-quarter lead of household investment over business
investment has remained a robust stylized fact. It is present even in the post-1984 US data, a
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time period during which the effective tax rate on capital has been below 40%, as noted above.
Household investment has also remained more volatile relative to business investment in the post-
1984 period. The correct calibration of the capital income tax rate in Fisher’s (2007) model to
account for these investment dynamics in the post-1984 period is, therefore, 35% and not 70%.
Table 1: Capital Income Taxation Rates, τk
(%)
A. Extremely High (τk ≥ 70%)
1. Hornstein and Praschnik (1997) 80
2. Fisher (2007) 70
3. Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995) 70
4. Gomme, Kydland, and Rupert (2001) 70
B. High (40%< τk <70%)
1. Kydland, Rupert, and Sustek (2016) 61
C. Moderate (τk ≤40%)
1 Gomme, Ravikumar, and Rupert (2011) 40
2. Robert E. Lucas (1990) 36
3. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) 36
4. McGrattan and Prescott (2005) 35
5. Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) 34
6. McDaniel (2007) 30
7. Gomme and Rupert (2007) 29
III Fisher’s (2007) model with a 35% capital income
tax rate
Having provided the justification for calibrating the capital income tax rate to 35% in the previous
section, we now show that Fisher (2007) model produces counterfactual investment dynamics under
this calibration. The appendix describes the complete model with variable names (Table 5), pa-
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Table 2: Dynamic correlations between household investment at t+j and business
investment at t: ρ(xht+j, xmt) and the relative volatility of household investment
over business investment: σxh/σxm
Correlations
Relative
volatility
j = -2 -1 0 1 2 σxh/σxm
Fisher (2007) .68 - .38 - - .18 1.30
(.08) (.07) (.09) (.12)
1949Q1-2016Q3 .68 .56 .38 .11 -.13 1.58
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.08) (.13)
1949Q1-2004Q4 .68 .57 .34 .05 -.21 1.69
(.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.12)
1984Q1-2016Q3 .61 .53 .42 .26 .11 1.15
(.12) (.13) (.13) (.14) (.16) (.15)
Note—Household investment is residential investment plus consumer durables. Standard
errors estimated by Generalized Method of Moments are in parentheses. The source of
investment data is the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Table 1. The cyclical components
are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
rameters and calibration (Table 6), and factor shares in the production of market goods (Table 7).
Throughout, we use exactly the same notation as Fisher’s (2007) for convenience. Relative to other
models with home production, Fisher introduces a key new parameter µ which controls the degree of
household capital complementarity in the market production function: yt = k
α
t
[
hµmt(ztnmt)
1−µ]1−α.
The share of household capital, hmt, in the production of non-durable market goods is µ(1− α).
We now address the main issue of capital income tax calibration. As explained by Fisher (2007),
seven parameters (ψ, η, φ, δh, α, δm, γz) are chosen to match seven calibration targets in the steady-
state. On the other hand, the parameter that governs the household capital’s share in effective labor,
µ, “is chosen by minimizing a measure of the distance between a given version of the model and
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empirical dynamic correlations between detrended log household and business investment” (Fisher
(2007), p.154). Specifically, there are five correlations that enter the loss function, denoted as L(µ):
the contemporaneous correlation and the cross-correlations between the two investment series that
are estimated at one and two quarters leads and lags.2
Figure 1: Dynamic correlations and relative volatilities for τk = 0.35
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Note—The top panel presents correlations between household investment at t+j with busi-
ness investment at t for j = −2 (blue dashed line) , 0 (solid green line), 2 (dotted red line).
Specifically, for regions in that panel where the dotted red line is above the two other lines
household investment is lagging business investment, regions where the blue dashed line is
above household investment is leading, and regions where the solid green line is above, no
type of investment is leading nor lagging the other type of investment. The vertical red
lines show Fisher’s (2007) estimate of the household capital income share µ(1 − α) = .15
where µ = .19 and α = .28. The black vertical lines show the share at the optimized value
of µ = .35 and µ(1 − α) = .28. The solid blue line in the bottom panel shows the ratio of
standard deviations of household investment over business investment.
We use the same calibration targets to simulate the model for seven parameters and consider
2See Fisher (2007), equation (13), page 154.
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a wide range of values for µ. In Figure 1 is similar to Fisher’s (2007) Figure 5 for a 35% capital
income tax and display the results for the household capital income share µ(1 − α). In the top
panel, we show how correlations are affected by the value of µ. The solid green line corresponds
to the contemporaneous correlation between household and business investment, whereas the blue
dashed and red dotted lines correspond to the correlations with two-quarter lead and lag, respec-
tively. In the bottom panel, we present the relative volatility of household investment over business
investment. There are also two vertical lines in the two panels. The vertical red lines correspond
to Fisher’s (2007) estimate of µ(1 − α) = .15 where µ = .19 and α = .28. The black vertical lines
correspond to the optimized value of the household capital income share µ(1 − α) = .28, where
µ = .35 and α = .21.
Table 3: Dynamic correlations between household investment at t+j and business
investment at t, ρ(xht+j, xmt), and the relative volatility of household investment
over business investment σxh/σxm. Data and Model
Correlations
Relative
volatility
j = -2 -1 0 1 2 σxh/σxm
Data .68 .56 .38 .11 -.13 1.58
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.08) (.13)
Model (µ = .19) .02 .12 .19 .86 .64 .62
Model (µ = .35) .66 .88 .2 .14 .04 1.26
Note—The dynamic correlations and the relative volatility that appear in the first line
are computed from investment series that span from 1949Q1 to 2016Q3 (Table 2), and the
other moments reported in the second and third lines are generated by the model for capital
income taxation τk = .35. The largest correlations are highlighted in bold.
For the same degree of household capital complementarity estimated by Fisher (2007), µ =
.19, a 35% capital income tax rate cannot deliver the lead of household investment over business
investment. In fact, household investment lags business investment as shown in the top panel of
Figure 1 and in Table 3. Moreover, the correlation between household investment two quarters
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ago and current business investment is essentially zero. However, as shown in Table 2, it is over
.5 in the data. In a reverse fashion, the correlation between business investment two quarters ago
and current household investment is over .5, whereas it is close to zero in the data. In terms of
volatility, household investment is counter-factually less volatile than business investment, with a
relative volatility of .62 as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Taken together, our analysis
reveals that the capital income taxation of 35% in Fisher’s (2007) model produces striking changes
in investment dynamics relative to a taxation of 70%.
Remarkably, the range of values of µ(1 − α) over which household investment is leading busi-
ness investment by one quarter, and the contemporaneous correlation between the two types of
investment is positive, is both high and narrow. It implies a range of µ = [.32, .36] for the degree
of household capital complementarity. The optimized value of µ = .35 is more than 1.8 times
higher than the value of µ = .19 that Fisher (2007, p.155) considers empirically plausible: “So,
[...], µ = .19 seems empirically plausible.”.
Why does the loss function require a much greater complementarity of household capital when
the capital taxation is 35%? The reason is that, holding all else equal, the capital tax rate of 35%
gives households more incentive to invest in business capital relative to household capital following
a positive technology shock. The household capital complementarity channel is, therefore, required
to be much stronger (a higher µ) to overcome this incentive that is in favour of business investment.
As shown in Figure 1, this is indeed the case. The degree of household capital complementarity
must increase to a high level to force the model to deliver the lead of household investment over
business investment.
III.I Why is household capital complementarity of µ = .35 an
implausible value?
As shown above, when the capital tax rate is 35%, the value of household capital complementarity
in the model must increase from µ = .19 to a narrow range of [.32, .36], with the optimized value
of µ = .35. But this value is not plausible given the empirical estimates in Fisher’s (2007) (Table 1
on page 148). The reason is that when µ = .35, it implies that the share of business capital (.21)
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is less than the share of household capital in market production (.28).3 Fisher’s (2007) empirical
findings, however, show that it is actually the opposite—the estimated business capital share is
uniformly and significantly larger than the estimated household capital share in market production
across all specifications. Table 4 shows Fisher’s (2007) empirical estimates.
Table 4: Household Capital and Business Capital Shares in Market Production
(Fisher (2007))
Household Capital .16∗ .33∗∗ .32∗∗
(.09) (.09) (.09)
Business Capital .36∗ .45∗∗ .45∗∗
(.03) (.05) (.05)
Note—The estimates shown are reported in columns 3, 4, & 5 of Table 1 in Fisher (2007)
with standard errors in parenthesis. ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 10%
level.
Note that these shares are quite precisely estimated with very small standard errors. Larger
values of µ in the model imply counterfactual relative magnitudes of factor shares when compared to
their estimated counterparts shown in Table 4. Specifically, in order to match the seven calibration
targets listed in Fisher (2007), the threshold value of µ is .26. At that value the income shares
of household and business capital are equal. Any value of µ above that threshold results in a
household capital share that is greater than the business capital share, and therefore, not plausible
given the estimates in Fisher’s (2007) shown in Table 4.
IV Conclusion
We demonstrate that the explanation for the lead of household investment over business investment
provided by Fisher (2007) requires an extremely high tax rate of 70% on capital income. When this
tax is calibrated to 35% based on the median value of the moderate empirical estimates provided
in the literature, the proposed mechanism cannot account for the lead-lag pattern in the US data
3Table 7 in the Appendix shows the factor income shares in the production of market goods implied by
Fisher’s (2007) calibration and our calibration.
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for any plausible degree of household capital complementarity. Household investment lags business
investment, and household investment is less volatile relative to business investment. Based on
these counterfactual results, we conclude that an explanation of the long-standing stylized facts
of US investment dynamics in a plausibly calibrated model remains a significant challenge for
understanding the origins of business cycles and their propagation.
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A The Fisher (2007) model
Table 5: Variables in the Fisher (2007) model.
Model variables
1. cmt Consumption good purchased from the market
2. cht Consumption good produced at home
3. nht Hours used in home production
4. nmt Hours supplied to the labour market
5. n˜mt Effective hours supplied to the market
6. hnt Stock of household capital used in producing cht
7. hct Stock of household capital used in producing n˜mt
8. zt Neutral technology shock
9. pmt Price of household’s investment in business capital
10. xmt Quantity of household’s investment in business capital
11. pht Price of household’s investment in household capital
12. xht Quantity of household’s investment in household capital
13. kt Household’s stock of business capital
14. ht Household’s stock of household capital
15. wt Wage for effective hours
16. rt Rental on capital
17. ht Total household capital
18. vmt Business investment-specific technology
19. vht Household investment-specific technology
20. θt Exogenous technology shock
21. ξt Government revenues
22. yt Market output
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Table 6: Parameters in the Fisher (2007) model: τk = 0.7 and the optimized value of
household capital complementarity µˆ = 0.19. For our calibration of τk = 0.35, the optimal
value of µˆ = 0.35.
Model parameters and calibration
Fisher (2007) Our calibration
1. τk .7 .35 Tax rate on capital income
2. µ .19 .35 Optimal household capital’s share in effective labour
3. ψ .56 .42 Weight parameter on consumption of home-produced good
4. η .76 .67 Weight parameter on leisure
5. φ .19 .05 Share of household capital in producing cht
6. δh .017 .019 Depreciation rate on household capital
7. α .28 .21 Share of business capital in market production
8. δm .019 .019 Depreciation rate on market capital
9. γz 1.0026 1.001 Rate of neutral technical change
10. τn .25 .25 Tax rate on labour income
11. β .99 .99 Discount factor
12. γm 1.002 1.002 Rate of household-specific technical change
13. γh 1.003 1.003 Rate of business-specific technical change
14. ρ .95 .95 Persistence of neutral technology shock
15. σ .007 .007 Volatility of the neutral technology shock
Note—Following Fisher (2007), parameters ψ, η, φ, δh, α, δm, and γz are chosen to match
seven calibration targets in the steady-state.
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Table 7: A different household capital share µ also implies different factor income shares.
Factor income shares in the production of market goods
Fisher (2007) Our calibration
Household capital hmt .14 .28
Business capital kt .28 .21
Hours worked nt .58 .51
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A.I Households
The representative household’s utility maximization problem is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
ln cmt + ψ ln
(
hφct
(
ztnht
)1−φ)
+ η ln
(
1− nmt − nht
)
+
λ1t
[
(1− τk)rtkt + (1− τn)wthµnt
(
ztnmt
)1−µ
+ δmτkkt + ξt − cmt − pmt
(
kt+1 − (1− δm)kt
)− pht(ht+1 − (1− δh)ht)
]
+
λ2t
[
ht − hnt − hct
]
(1)
First-order conditions
c mt:
1
cmt
= λ1t (2)
h ct:
ψ
hφct(ztnht)
1−φ (ztnht)
1−φhφ−1ct = λ1t (3)
ψφ
hct
= λ2t (4)
n ht:
ψ(1− φ)
nht
=
η
1− nmt − nht (5)
n mt
λ1t(1− τn)(1− µ)wthµntn−µmt z1−µt =
η
1− nmt − nht (6)
k t+1
pmt = βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t
(
pmt+1(1− δm) + (rt+1 − (1− δm)τk)
)
(7)
h nt
λ2t
λ1t
= (1− τn)µwt(ztnmt)1−µhµ−1nt (8)
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h t+1
pht = βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t
(
pht+1(1− δh − τh) + λ2t+1
λ1t+1
)
(9)
Household-level production functions
n˜mt = h
µ
nt(ztnmt)
1−µ (10)
cht = h
φ
ct(ztnht)
1−φ (11)
Investment equations4
xmt = kt+1 − (1− δm)kt (12)
xht = ht+1 − (1− δh)ht (13)
A.II Firms
The representative firm’s profit-maximization problem is
max
n˜mt,kt
kαt n˜
1−α
mt − rtkt − wtn˜mt (14)
The FOCs with respect to k t and n˜mt are:
αkα−1t = rt (15)
(1− α)n˜−αmt = wt (16)
4We consider one-period time-to-build as Fisher (2007) shows that increasing time-to-build per se does
not reconcile real business cycle theory with the investment dynamics.
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A.III Market clearing and investment prices
Expressions for output from the aggregate supply and demand sides:
yt = k
α
t n˜
1−α
mt (17)
yt = cmt + pmtxmt + phtxht (18)
Exogenously evolving investment prices:
pmt =
1
vmt
(19)
pht =
1
vht
(20)
A.IV Government
ξt = τkrtkt + τnwtn˜mt − δmτkkt (21)
B Stationarized model
Since business and household investment-specific technology grow at constant rates, we need to
stationarize the model presented in the previous section. First, we define vzt = γ
t
z which speci-
fies the deterministic growth component. All hatted variables correspond to stationary variables.
yˆt =
yt
At−1
, kˆt−1 =
kt−1
At−1vkt−1
, hˆt−1 =
ht−1
At−1vht−1
, hˆct−1 =
hct−1
At−1vht−1
, hˆnt−1 =
hnt−1
At−1vht−1
where
At = vzt
[
v
µ(1−α)
ht v
α
kt
]1/((1−µ)(1−α))
.
The expression for output for which effective labor supply has been substituted in is as follows:
yˆt = kˆ
α
t−1hˆ
µ(1−α)
nt−1 (γzztnmt)
(1−µ)(1−α) (22)
As for the expenditure side, xˆmt =
xmt
At−1vkt−1
, xˆht =
xht
At−1vht−1
and cˆmt =
cmt
At−1
, so that:
yˆt = cˆmt + xˆmt + xˆht (23)
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The capital accumulation equations are as follows:
xˆmt = γAγkkˆt − (1− δm)kˆt−1 (24)
xˆht = γAγhhˆt − (1− δh)hˆt−1 (25)
where γA = γz
(
γαmγ
µ(1−α)
h
)1/((1−µ)(1−α))
. As for the firms’ FOCs:
αyˆt = rˆtkˆt−1 (26)
(1− α)yˆt = ŵtn˜mt (27)
where rˆt = rtvkt−1 and ŵtn˜mt =
wtn˜mt
At−1
.
As for the remaining FOCs, they are obtained by substituting in λ1t and λ2t and using the
definitions of the hatted variables.
η
1− nmt − nht =
(1− τn)(1− µ)ŵtn˜mt
cˆmtnmt
(28)
η
1− nmt − nht =
ψ(1− φ)
nht
(29)
γA
cˆmt
=
β
cˆmt+1
((1− δm(1− τm))/γm + (1− τm)rˆt+1) (30)
γA
cˆmt
=
β(1− δh − τh)
γhcˆmt+1
+
βψφ
hˆct
(31)
γA
cˆmt
=
β
cˆmt+1
(
(1− δh − τh)/γh + (1− τn)µ
̂wt+1n˜mt+1
hˆmt
)
(32)
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